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This study shows that China’s post-1949 state-led industrialization has closely followed 
an underlying path that began in the late nineteenth century. It was initiated by pressing 
national defence needs and has since been motivated by the same and strong incentives 
for a faster catch-up with the West despite radical regime shifts. Government 
determined or influenced resource allocation benefited selected industries and hence 
nurtured vested interest groups connecting and integrating with the ruling elite, which 
have strengthened and sustained the path. This means that the path is inherently 
inefficient which is evidenced by a newly constructed dataset. Reform measures can 
only temporarily improve efficiency performance, but are unable to break the path in the 
absence of a genuine political democracy.  
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1 Introduction   
Economic theory can logically explain how a pre-industrialization economy may grow 
out of its traditional or agrarian constraints, and hence start an industrialization process 
that will go through a sequence of stages as described by ‘stylized facts’ in textbooks. 
However, economic history shows that there has never been a universal path of 
industrialization among countries (Maddison 1995, 2001).1 One of the factors that make 
countries significantly diverge in their paths of industrialization is the role of state, that 
is, how and to what extent the government has influenced or intervened in the allocation 
of resources through policy instruments and hence has transformed and shaped the 
course of economic development.2  
Though much has been written about the uniqueness of China’s industrialization, the 
literature still lacks an integrated view—conceptually as well as empirically—on 
China’s experiences with more than 100 years of industrialization prior to the market-
oriented industrial reforms in the mid-1980s.3 Most studies focus on the post-reform 
period’s unprecedented growth spurt driven by a series of policy changes and 
institutional rearrangements using the performance of the planning era as a reference. 
The poorer productivity performance under central planning is widely considered as a 
fiasco resulting from an imported Soviet model of industrialization that completely 
ignored China’s comparative advantage (see Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). However, I would 
argue that China’s path of industrialization is not unique because of its distinct resource 
endowments as the world most populous country, its cultural and ideological heritages, 
or institutional traditions. What distinguishes China is the unique role of the state 
throughout China’s long pursuit for modernization since the mid-nineteenth century 
when Western powers forced the country to open up. Chinese governments, under 
different regimes in the past over one and a half centuries intervened, engineered, and 
hence shaped the course of China’s industrialization at almost every vital stage. This not 
only laid important foundations for, but also created constraints on the subsequent 
development. Heavy government intervention on such a large scale is not only 
inherently inefficient but is also likely to have made China’s industrialization course 
path-dependent. This will be explored further in this paper.  
Collecting, organizing, and interpreting historical evidence on the role of the state in 
China’s industrialization is unavoidably subjective and cannot easily be done in a 
systematic way. Here I will rely on a more objective approach to analyse the role and 
impact of the state, using a newly constructed dataset designed to tackle major data 
shortcomings in standard growth accounting analysis. The data covers the Chinese 
                                                 
1  Also see Maddison (1970) for the role of government in driving and shaping the courses of economics 
development among countries through various industrial policies. 
2  Of course, as correctly put by Mason (1960), the government, as part of the given society or history 
and inevitably shaped by it, cannot go and shape the course of the society’s development as far as it 
likes. Ultimately, how far it can go depends on how the government intervenes in the principle of cost 
and benefit of the economy and the society.  
3  Although popularly used in official documentation and by researchers, the year of 1978 can be 
accepted as the timeline to distinguish China’s reform period from its planning past, the nationwide 
agricultural reform only began in 1979–80 and industrial reform in 1985 along with a dual-track price 
system.    2
aggregate economy and its major sectors since 1949 (Wu 2011). The industrial part of 
the dataset will be linked, in a preliminary fashion, with earlier series going back to 
1912, the time when the Republican Revolution ended China’s Qing Dynasty and set off 
a new wave of investment in modern industries.  
To structure this paper, the second section briefly discusses the key factors explaining 
government intervention in the modern economic development in general. The next 
section attempts to use a novel approach to explore the role of the government in 
China’s post-1949 industrialization, using India’s growth path as a reference. Then, the 
fourth section attempts to identify trends in China’s industrial production since the 
beginning of the twentieth century to substantiate my path-dependence conjecture. The 
fifth section sets out the new dataset to be used. Based on this data the sixth section 
presents a systematic analysis of the growth, sectoral change and productivity 
performance of the Chinese economy throughout both the planning and the reform 
periods, against the background of major policy regime shifts. The final section 
concludes the main findings with a deeper discussion of the nature of the ‘China model’ 
problems which will shed light on how to break the inefficient path that has been 
sustained and developed by strong state interests.  
2  Why do governments intervene in economic development? 
The direct reason for governments to intervene or even engage in economic activities 
lies in state interests, ranging from a concern for national security to a desire to catch up 
with the advanced countries, but the root cause of intervention is economic 
backwardness, which is essentially determined by the time when a country begins its 
course of industrialization. Gerschenkron (1962), who is one of the first authors to 
introduce the concept of backwardness, relates an increasing role of the state to the 
degree of backwardness found in the society in which the process of industrialization is 
being initiated. By influencing the goals of the society and the motivations of its 
political elites, backwardness can shift the responsibility of development to government 
because it can play an important role in the transfer of new technologies and the 
establishment of new industries as well as their required institutions. In this sense, 
backwardness may result in a government-facilitated process of accelerated catch-up in 
which a country can skip some of the earlier unnecessary stages of technological 
development.  
Government intervention is widely observed with the post-Second World War late-
industrializers that were pressured to pursue rapid catch-up. Amongst these, the newly 
industrialized countries in East Asia have been studied most thoroughly to identify the 
causes of their successes, especially with regard to the role of government. However, 
researchers still remain divided on how to relate various government interventions to the 
unprecedented growth performance of these countries.4 The active role of the state is 
not only confined to the late industrializers but can also be observed in the countries 
which industrialized earlier. Concerns about technological backwardness, national 
security, and welfare improvement were the main driving forces. As shown by Aubrey 
(1949) with ample evidence, the adoption of the new English innovations by the French 
was stimulated by the Continental Blockade of the Napoleonic Era in Europe (1799–
                                                 
4  For example, see different views in a NBER East Asia volume edited by Ito and Krueger (1995).   3
1815). The struggle for independence (1775–83), the self-imposed embargo (1807), and 
its war aftermath (1812–15) in the USA had similar functions. Governments took 
deliberate actions to foster the formation of national industries typically by establishing 
machinery industries, promoting mechanical production, and encouraging the widest 
possible distribution of the new technology because ‘most governments were reluctant 
to see their industries decline under the impact of increased foreign productivity and to 
risk subsequent domestic shortages’ (Aubrey 1951: 266–7). Government intervention 
became accentuated in the Schumpeterian gales of technological innovations and 
international competitions in the second wave of the industrial revolution that began in 
the 1850s, because of ever-increasing needs for the state to timely facilitate 
entrepreneurial initiatives by setting up venture capital support and by distributing the 
latest technical knowhow.  
The nature of prevailing technological stage also matters. As argued by Amsden (1991), 
who conducted a thorough investigation in the determinants of South Korea’s 
industrialization in 1989, the main reason for government intervention to become 
indispensable in East Asia is that late industrialization was driven by imitating the 
existing technologies rather than innovating new ones. This is because  
… [in] the absence of pioneering technology, low wages even in labor 
intensive sectors usually fail to provide a cost advantage at market 
determined prices. Persistent problems of competitiveness … have 
compelled the state to play a more active role than in the past (ibid.: 
1991: 285). 
In essence, the nature of the government intervention is subsidization, explicit or 
implicit, to help establish, strengthen or maintain a cost advantage.  
I would argue that the timing of industrialization and the nature of technology 
determined by the timing of industrialization are still insufficient to explain the active 
role of the state. Here we should not disregard the role of the economies of scale 
reflected by the size of a country.5 This argument is related to resource constraints. It is 
very costly for small countries to build up their own producer goods industries due to 
the lack of economies of scale.6 Instead, small countries can benefit from exchanging 
goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage (typically natural 
resources or related services) for imports of manufactured goods from other countries. 
A small economy is necessarily more dependent on trade than a large economy 
(Kuznets 1958). Since it is small enough to be a price taker and hence has little 
influence on world market prices, it presents no threat to other countries and can rely on 
international alliances for purposes of national security. Since a small country can 
                                                 
5  See empirical evidence about the effect of country size on growth and structural change in Chenery 
and Syrquin (1975) and Perkins and Syrquin (1989). 
6  How to define the ‘size’ of a country can be controversial. It depends on the purpose of the researcher. 
Resource-wise, both the size of population and the land area are important. If considering market 
power (price taker or price maker), per capita income has to be added in. The type of available natural 
resources may also be considered for atypical cases (e.g. oil-rich). When the purpose is set, both the 
cross-country mean and standard deviation should be considered when defining ‘size’. For example, I 
would define large (small) countries to be above (below) one standard deviation from the mean, thus 
the rest of the countries are considered average in size. Such an empirical exercise is not pursued in 
this study. However, by any standard, China unquestionably falls into a large country category.    4
achieve modernization without going through a typical industrialization process 
involving the establishing of its own capital goods sector, it is not necessary for the state 
to play an active role, even in a latecomer country. This is not the case of large 
countries. Obviously, it is too risky for a large country to rely on other countries for the 
supply of key technologies, main producer goods, and basic needs as suggested by the 
free trade argument. This is because such supplies have to be large in magnitude and 
hence, if interrupted, they can significantly obstruct the operation of the economy.7 
Equally important, large size can help reduce the high initial cost of the development of 
heavy industry (benefiting from economies of scale). With much more resources and 
potentially a much larger market than a small country, it is appealing for the 
government to engineer industrialization through a planned allocation of resources in 
which heavy industries are prioritized.  
Although all these considerations may well explain why a government has to intervene 
for the sake of economic development, they tell us little about the likely consequence of 
the intervention. Perhaps economic efficiency is the foremost consideration in assessing 
the consequence of government intervention, though efficiency as such is rarely an 
integral part of government objectives. If we argue that efficiency is one of the ultimate 
constraints that determine how and to what extent the state can play an active role in 
economic development, that is to say that there is an endogeneity between the 
intervention and its consequence. In fact, the efficiency issue is the core of the recently 
revitalized debate on whether the government industrial policy should be comparative 
advantage-conforming or defying (Lin 2009; Lin and Chang 2009). The issue of the 
efficiency of government intervention will be empirically examined in this study for the 
Chinese case, using newly constructed time series.  
3  Exploring the role of government in China’s post-1949 development 
Studies on China’s post-1949 industrialization are generally concerned with policy 
issues and in assessing the role of government in the development. They can be roughly 
divided into two categories: policy-focused and measurement-oriented studies. Policy-
focused studies tend to document the details of important policy changes and then 
speculate about their likely impacts—benefits or mistakes that may have important 
implications for future policy changes or institutional reforms. Historical roots of the 
prevailing policies may be traced but the analysis is mostly ad hoc in nature.  
On the other hand, the measurement-oriented studies are mostly data-driven and tend to 
put industrial policy or the role of government in industrialization under a kind of 
‘consequence test’ typically in a production function framework. Scholars in this camp 
have also pursued more detailed breakdowns of economic performance, such as by 
industry, region, or ownership type. Data inadequacies have, however, remained as a 
major source of different and sometimes contradictory findings among researchers in 
                                                 
7  There is also a silent unfavourable factor for very large countries that are engaged in trade. Large 
countries in international trade can induce a self-enhanced deteriorating terms of trade that harms 
themselves, i.e. what large countries can produce and hence export tend to lower international prices 
and what they have to import tend to push up international prices.   5
terms of real growth rates, structural change, and productivity performance of the 
economy either as a whole or by various breakdowns.8  
In what follows, I first explore the role of government in China’s post-1949 
development using India as a benchmark. Instead of comparing per capita income 
growth, structural change, and productivity performance between the two economies as 
often made in existing studies, I first use a simple ‘trend-benchmarking’ approach to 
examine the actual growth path of each country over the long-run against a hypothetical 
trend based on its own growth experience at the earlier period of the growth path. The 
growth trend of the 1950s in each country is set as the hypothetical trend because the 
1950s can be considered the first decade of peaceful development after the Second 
World War and the civil war in China (1949) and the independence in India (1947).  
Based on the ‘trend-benchmarking’ I then make a comparison between the two 
economies. Despite some obvious incompatibilities between the world’s two most 
populous countries, India is best suited to benchmark China not only because of their 
comparable size and stage of development, but also because both adopted a Soviet-type 
central planning in the 1950s. However, in contrast to China, India did not completely 
close down the market and eliminate the private sector, which makes good sense for us 
to explore the role of government.  
Based on Maddison’s (2003) estimates in the 1870s both China’s population size and 
the level of GDP were about 40 per cent larger than those of India. After conversion 
into 1990 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, the two countries had almost the same 
level of per capita GDP.9 However, their subsequent social and economic development 
paths diverged. As shown in Figure 1, by the early 1950s, China’s per capita GDP was 
only about 60 per cent of that of the India, or US$380 versus US$620 (in 2010 PPPs, 
TCB 2011). This income gap can be used to represent the differences in the initial 
conditions for the post-war growth in the two economies. 
The evolution of Chinese and Indian per capita GDP over the long period 1950–2010 is 
depicted in Figure 1 (in logarithmic scale), with an estimated trend for each country 
based on the performance in the 1950s. Note that the trend implicitly assumes a growth 
path that the initial conditions were able to support. Here, I propose the following 
working hypothesis: if the 1950s’ trend growth rate was mainly determined by market 
forces or the underlying fundamentals rather than government intervention, the 
economy would be able to basically follow the trend extrapolation, experiencing normal 
cycles, but not substantially deviating from the trend.  
Strikingly enough, despite a much lower starting level of per capita income, hence less 
ability to save and invest, China’s trend growth rate in the 1950s was much higher than 
that of India: 4.6 against 1.6 per cent per annum. Nonetheless, China’s growth path was 
much more volatile than that of India. A more important observation is that in spite of 
episodes of faster growth as revealed by the short-term growth trends, China 
underperformed relative to its 1950s trend for most of the period, and only returned to 
                                                 
8  In a review of studies measuring China’s total factor productivity. I show that how contradictory 
results could be caused by severe data problem in measuring labour, capital, and output (Wu 2011). 
9  Measured in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollar (see Maddison 2003).   6
the extrapolated trend around 2005. By contrast, India basically followed its 1950s trend 
extrapolation till about the end of the 1980s, when, at an income level of about 
US$1,270 per capita (taking the annual average of per capita incomes of 1988–90 from 
Figure 1), it embarked on an unprecedented acceleration, which seemingly established a 
new trend with an annual growth rate of 4.8 per cent (indicated by the triangles in the 
figure). Interestingly, this new trend more or less replicates the growth rate that China 
had achieved in the 1950s (4.6 per cent) starting from a much lower initial level of 
income of US$380. This observation clearly suggests that there were stronger non-
market forces affecting the course of industrialization in China than in India.  
The initial income level of China and India at the beginning of the 1950s was very low 
by international standards, only 17 and 28 per cent of the world average of US$2,200 
(an average of 1950–52), respectively. Compared to the rest of Asia (excluding Japan, 
China, and India), with a level of per capita income of US$730 at the beginning of the 
1950s and an annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent over the 1950s (TCB 2011), India’s 
annual growth of 1.6 per cent does not look atypically slow even taking its lower 
income level (US$620) into account. In comparison, China’s much higher annual 
growth rate of 4.6 per cent starting at an even lower initial income level (US$380), 
implying less capabilities to save and invest, does not seem plausible without pre-
existing production capacity (to be discussed below) and/or state engineered investment 
through forced savings.10 If we follow neoclassical convergence theory, a country’s 
saving rate is one of the conditions that needs to be controlled for poorer economies to 
grow faster than richer ones (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Mankiw, Romer, and Weill 
1992). Indeed, such a high-growth performance in China was achieved at the time when 
the state closed the market and mobilized resources through radical nationalization, 
confiscation, land reform and collectivization, in other words by forced savings, to 
facilitate a Soviet-type, ambitious heavy industry-oriented Five-Year Plan (FYP) (1953–
57).  
Undoubtedly, China’s growth drive in the 1950s was already overstretched given the 
existing conditions. Therefore, it is almost impossible for China to achieve an even 
faster growth rate subsequently without a more active role of the state to mobilize the 
required resources. Of course, one should not forget that the nature of the central 
planning also matters in understanding the ability of the government in resource 
mobilization. In China, the central planning system was adopted as a coherent part of 
the Marxist ideology that laid the very foundation of the regime. Thus, industrial 
policies were implemented with strong political reasoning and underpinning, hence 
unchallengeable. By contrast in India, constitutionally a democratic system was 
implemented and maintained. The central planning system was adopted mainly as the 
means to achieve faster industrialization. The government’s industrial policies could 
still be debated and challenged without fear of political prosecution. It is impossible to 
implement an unrealistic high-growth or leap-forward plan at any expense. In China, the 
planning control was all-embracing and far-reaching and replaced the market system. 
Resources, including consumer goods, were administratively allocated according to 
                                                 
10 Taking into account the initial income level at the beginning of the 1950s, China’s high growth rate 
over the 1950s also seems incompatible with its Eastern European socialist counterparts. Of those 
with similar economic structures or more of agrarian economy-based, Albania grew by 3.6 percent a 
year but with an initial income of US$1,300 and Bulgaria grew by 3.7 percent a year with an even 
higher initial income of US$2,400 (TCB 2011).   7
national plans, leaving little room for private activities. Although the planning 
authorities in India also had tight controls over resource allocation, the market still 
functioned though subject to some degree of distortion, and there was still room for 
private initiatives.  
My question is whether such a scale of domestic resource mobilization was sufficient 
for implementing an ambitious heavy industrialization plan so successfully (as 
suggested by China’s high performance of the 1950s). In this regard, studies often 
emphasize the importance of the Soviet assistance with 156 key heavy industry projects 
(Lin, Cai, and Li 1996). Nevertheless, the financing of those projects was not through 
aids but through loans, and they were fully paid for by Chinese exports by the early 
1960s (Zeitz 2010). In other words, these projects were supported by Chinese savings. 
To have successfully implemented and operated these ambitious projects in a war-torn 
huge country, there must have been an industrial base in China, not only in terms of 
infrastructure and complementary industries, but also in terms of human capital stock. 
Admittedly, the Soviet Union also provided engineers for implementing the imported 
plants (they were part of the loans), but there must have already a large number of 
skilled workers and technicians who were able to work in those modern capital- and 
technological-intensive factories. Besides, even more importantly, there must have also 
been sufficient numbers of professionals, ranging from administrators, managers and 
accountants to scientists, engineers, and technicians, whose training and experiences 
satisfied the basic requirements of a planning system operating in a large country like 
China. Before I go further with this inquiry, let us again look at Chinese and Indian 
growth performances over the entire period in Figure 1. 
Intuitively, China’s high-growth path appeared to be less ‘natural’ than that of India. 
Remarkably, each of the subsequent greater efforts to achieve more rapid growth in 
China had to make up for the losses caused by the previous shocks apparently caused by 
policy mistakes or political instabilities. This implies that China had to save and invest 
more in order to achieve the given rate of growth, which can be clearly seen by zooming 
in on the Chinese growth path in Figure 1 (based on per capita real income). For 
example, a faster annual growth of 7.6 per cent obtained in 1963–66, a period that saw a 
significant policy retreat from the Maoist feverish Great Leap Forward (GLF) 
campaign. This growth rate somehow compensated for the high cost of a significant 
decline in per capita GDP by 5.7 per cent a year in the disastrous GLF aftermath in 
1959–62. In fact, the average growth from 1959 to 1968 was virtually zero.  
Another almost equally rapid yet shorter-lived growth spurt was achieved in 1969–70, 
with growth at 7.1 per cent per annum, seemingly engineered to support Mao’s triumph 
over his political enemies in vital struggles in 1967–68 (the most chaotic period of the 
Cultural Revolution) that had caused a decline by 5 per cent a year in per capita income. 
Next, the period 1971–79 witnessed an average growth rate of 3.2 per cent per annum, 
which was also highly volatile, including a long period of stagnation between 1971 and 
1976 when GDP per capita merely grew by 1.5 per cent a year as a result of prolonged 
political struggles that were ended by Mao’s death, and a neo-GLF campaign period in 
1977–78 when growth jumped to 6.9 per cent a year to economically proclaim Deng’s 
victory over Madam Mao’s elite group (the Gang of Four).  
Since the late 1980s the duration of slowdowns has become shorter and the duration of 
growth episodes has become longer, thanks to Deng’s reforms and opening-up. 
However, there have still been policy-induced shocks that slowed down growth. For   8
example, the forced retreat from the neo-GLF slowed down growth to 3.3 per cent per 
annum in 1980–81; the Tiananmen movement (1989) and its aftermath reduced the 
annual growth rate to 1.1 per cent in 1989–90; and an overdosed austerity policy in 
1996 forced China into a hard landing resulting in merely 1 per cent growth, down from 
13 per cent in 1995. This was followed by the Asian financial crisis that caused negative 
growth in 1998.11 Again, these downturns were followed by two fast growth periods, 
one of 9.4 per cent a year in 1992–95 when Deng decreed bolder reforms and another 
one with growth of 10.2 per cent a year in 2001–10, which is the fastest and longest 
growth spurt in the history of Chinese industrialization, mainly attributed to a new type 
of government support that aimed to facilitate China’s entry to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and competition in the world market, an issue that will be revisited 
at the end of this paper.  
Some simple ‘what-if’ calculations suggest that China has indeed paid a very high ‘cost’ 
for disastrous policy mistakes and institutional shocks. Just before the global financial 
crisis at the end of 2008, China’s per capita GDP was about twice that of India (about 
US$6,200 versus US$3,000 in 2010 PPP$, TCB 2011). The Chinese path is seemingly 
superior to the Indian path if judged in this way. However, had the 1950s’ trend been 
closely followed, China could have surpassed India by the early 1960s at a level of 
US$1,080 per capita rather than two decades later (around 1984). Putting it a different 
way, if China did not swing like a roller coaster, it could have grown steadily by 3.4 per 
cent a year till it overtook India. Nonetheless, my purpose here is not to gauge the cost 
of China’s government-engineered industrialization, but to address the question why 
China seems willing to stick to a costly and inefficient track? Or to put it differently: 
was the course of China’s industrialization so heavily path-dependent, that breaking 
away from that path was even more costly than continuing it?  
4 History  matters 
By assuming that present practice is path-dependent, it argues that past choices and their 
outcomes along the way influence the present and hence alter the course of history 
(David 1985). What happens at the beginning may only be a small initial advantage or a 
few minor random shocks that result in an initial advantage. However, subsequent 
increasing returns from that initial advantage induce more choices to be made or more 
actions to be taken, hence creating a set of forces and complementary institutions that 
encourage and facilitate the sustaining of the earlier choices (North 1990; Page 2006). A 
path is then shaped in such a process and becomes self-reinforcing. In this sense, history 
matters (Page 2006). 
China’s industrialization and modernization did not begin in 1949, neither did 
government intervention in China’s economic development. Admittedly, government 
intervention may take different forms under different regimes in history. However, there 
                                                 
11 There is a controversy about the real growth rate of 1998 when China was badly hit by the Asian 
financial crisis, though this is denied by the authorities. While the official growth rate is reported as 
7.8 percent, conjectures (e.g. Rawski 2001) and alternative estimates (Maddison and Wu 2008) 
suggest it possibly to be around zero or even negative, which is further confirmed by my recent work 
(Wu 2011). Nonetheless, a substantial revision of the national accounts for the period 1992–2004 
following China’s First National Economic Census left 1998 untouched (Wu 2007).    9
is clear evidence that even with regard to central government industrial planning there 
was no sharp break in 1949. Thanks to Kirby’s (1984, 1990) careful studies with 
convincing facts, we now know that it is incorrect to completely attribute China’s post-
1949 planned industrialization to the influence of the Soviet Union (Eckstein 1975) or 
to the onset of the communist system (Cheng 1963) as widely believed by scholars in 
this field. Thus, the assumption that the assembling of China’s planning machine only 
began in the north east region (Manchuria) during the civil war period (1946–49) also 
implies that government-engineered industrialization began with the communist system 
in China (Donnithorne 1964; Levine 1987). It is also historically incorrect to relate 
China’s post-1949 development mainly to the pre-1949 private sector, which assumes 
that the role of the state in the China’s modern economic development was insignificant 
prior to the communist regime (Rawski 1980). Equally important, as put by Bian (2005) 
…[t]he basic institutional arrangement of China’s state-owned 
enterprise––the bureaucratic governance structure, the distinctive 
management and incentive mechanisms, and the provision of social 
services and welfare––took place during the Sino-Japanese War and was 
not derived from the Soviet model as is conventionally believed (ibid.: 
213). 
Taking a historical view, the first and foremost pre-1949 legacy for China’s post-1949 
industrialization is the state-owned and state-controlled industries that resorted under 
the National Resources Committee (NRC) of the nationalist government. The NRC was 
established in 193212 as a state agency that was mandated to ‘develop, operate and 
control’ all the nation’s basic industries and mines, as well as ‘such other enterprises as 
designated by the government’ (Kirby 1990: 127). Notably, it performed a role similar 
to that of the post-1949 State Planning Commission (SPC) under the communist 
government.13 By August 1947, after a significant wartime development and an equally 
important post-war expansion and restructuring that integrated the existing state 
establishments with the confiscated enterprises formerly under the control of the 
Japanese occupation authorities or the Chinese puppet government during the war, the 
NRC employed about 33,000 staff members (including scientific and engineering 
professionals as well as administrators and managers) and 230,000 workers (more than 
500,000 if we include joint ventures with provincial governments). It accounted for 67.3 
per cent of China’s total industrial capital.14 These numbers seem to have been growing 
without a significant break throughout the civil war period and over the time when the 
communist forces took power in 1949, thanks to the collaboration of the NRC senior 
management and staff members (Shao and Sun 1994).  
                                                 
12 Originally, the NRC was set up as the Defense Planning Committee under the General Staff 
Headquarters. In May 1935, it was brought under the administration of the National Military 
Committee as NRC. In March 1938, it was relocated to the Ministry of Economy, and in March 1946, 
it was put under the administration of the Executive Yuan (State Council). 
13 Indeed, two of the prominent members of NRC, Qian Changzhao and Sun Yueqi, who were also the 
last two NRC chairmen, served as vice-chairmen of the Central Financial and Economic Planning 
Bureau under the State Council’s Financial and Economic Commission, which was founded in 1951 
and the direct predecessor of the SPC set up two years later (Kirby 1990: 135).  
14 See Kirby (1990: 132, footnote 32) for sources of information.   10
By the end of 1949, based on my reconstructed data from official sources, there were 
already 3.15 million workers engaged in the state industrial sector, half of whom were 
engaged in heavy industries (Wu and Yue 2010). This estimate is close to another 
source of information that gives an estimate of 1.29 million workers in 1949 who came 
from the former NRC system and its nationwide industrial network and from the 
enterprises owned by the nationalist party, military and various government ministries 
(Wang 2010). The rest come from other sources such as enterprises seized by the 
communists in the north east (which were not all included in the NRC network and 
statistics), enterprises confiscated as a result of the civil war, and foreign enterprises 
purchased through forced acquisition (Wang 2010). By the end of 1952, or just before 
the Soviet technical assistance and loans became available, the state industrial sector 
had already employed 4.33 million staff and workers and had produced 18.8 billion 
yuan of output (gross value added at 1990 prices), which accounted for about 45 and 60 
per cent of the national totals, respectively (estimated based on Wu 2011).  
These simple figures suggest something very important, that is, China must have 
already developed a physical and human capital foundation by 1949 that was capable of 
accommodating the state-driven heavy industrialization under the new regime. The 
Soviet assistance and loans were undoubtedly important for China to recover and to 
expand with the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953–57. But it was more 
like a compensation for the destruction of the wars rather than a change of the 
underlying path. To explore this conjecture, I have made an attempt to construct China’s 
path of industrialization over the past century by linking my new estimates for industrial 
value added (Wu 2011) to those of Chang (1969) for the earlier period.15 The result is 
astonishingly supportive of the notion of continuity between the pre-1949 and post-1949 
periods, as shown in Figure 2. Despite all abnormal shocks because of wars and regime 
shifts, the underlying growth path does not seem to have changed as suggested by the 
estimated exponential trend.16  
In the first place, Figure 2 reveals that the underlying path might have started at least at 
the beginning of the 1900s (as far as the data can reach) and then developed steadily 
until being interrupted by the Japanese invasion in 1937. In the second place it shows 
that the post-war recovery growth began in 1947 and, despite a major interruption in 
1948 due to the impact of the civil war, it brought the industrial growth back to the 
earlier established track by 1952. This implies that the above-cited strong performance 
figures of the state industrial sector in 1949–52 may reflect largely, and logically, a 
                                                 
15 Chang’s work is perhaps the best of a limited number of the existing studies that have attempted to 
construct China’s industrial production index for the pre-1949 period. Chang’s index covers the entire 
economy including Manchuria in 1931–45 and the other Japanese occupied areas of China during the 
Sino-Japanese war in 1937–45 (Chang 1969). His index is based on carefully constructed 15 factory-
produced commodity series in five key industry groups: coal mining, other mining products, ferrous 
metals, power generation, and consumer goods. He has shown with evidence that the excluding of 
other commodities especially consumer goods due to poor data would not significantly affect the trend 
of the index. Chemicals and machinery industries are not included also due to data problem as well as 
insignificant development before the war. But he argues that their trends should have been captured by 
other heavy industries included in the index. 
16 The approach used here is very different from the one in Figure 1 in which the growth trend 
extrapolation of one period, i.e. the 1950s, is used to benchmark China’s per capita GDP growth over 
the period 1950–2010. In Figure 2 China’s real industrial growth over the period 1912–2009 is 
depicted against an estimated underlying trend.    11
result of a post-war recovery that made good use of the unemployed industrial 
capacities caused by the war and idle human resources including accumulated 
knowledge and experiences of the pre-war industrialization. Third, China’s post-1949 
high-growth path, often considered as beginning with China’s first FYP and attributed 
to the Soviet Union’s assistance, still closely followed the underlying path that began at 
least in the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, there was no such thing 
as a ‘revolutionary path’ established and sustained by the new regime. The first FYP, 
the GLF drama or the post-1978 reforms did not create a new path that deviated from 
the underlying long-run path.  
The fact that history matters does not mean that all history is relevant. What matters in 
history is the sequencing of events that change the course of the future (Page 2006). If 
we argue that China’s post-1949 state-planned and state-engineered industrialization is 
path-dependent, we need to consider which pre-1949 events in China induced or led to 
the subsequent events and hence shaped the course of China’s industrialization after 
1949. As discussed earlier, whether government plays an active role in a country’s 
industrial development is determined by two key factors: the timing of industrialization 
and the size of the country. I have argued that the catch up pressures on a latecomer 
could be enhanced if industrialization was motivated by the needs for national or regime 
security. This is very much the case for China. 
China’s modern industries were initially bred by the state in the second half of the 
nineteenth century especially during the government’s self-strengthening movement 
(yang wu yun dong) (1861–95). The movement was primarily motivated by China’s 
series of military defeats and concessions to the Western powers since the First Opium 
War (1839–42) as well as several devastating domestic uprisings of which the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850–64) was most regime-threatening and damaging. The main purpose of 
the self-strengthening movement was to catch up with the West by modernizing and 
industrializing. Because of increasing domestic and foreign threats to the regime, the 
state’s industrialization projects were essentially defence-oriented, stressing capital 
goods industries and supportive infrastructures. Powerful provincial governor-generals, 
instead of the weak imperial government, played a key role in the early 
industrialization. However, driven by strong local interests, competition among 
provincial governments enhanced the role of the state and speeded up the 
industrialization process. Government power was used to mobilize resources to build 
arsenals throughout coastal China in the 1860s and to develop infrastructures and 
commercial industries in the 1870s. Government power was also used to promote and 
adopt Western technologies and practices. In 1876, China’s first modern coal mine 
company and first telegraph company were established, followed by the first railway, 
first iron and steel works, and modern textile factories. These burgeoning industries 
were administered by a principle called guan du shang ban (literally ‘government 
supervision with merchant operation’) in which while the day-to-day running of the 
companies was in the hands of merchants, all major decisions were handled by officials. 
Importantly, this movement also helped nurture the development of state economic 
agencies that were responsible for planning, financing, and supporting the industrial 
projects.  
The defeat of the Qing Imperial Navy in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894 was the 
last straw for the Qing Dynasty. It also enhanced the new regime’s sense of national 
crisis and encouraged Chinese national elites to believe in an active role of the state in   12
China’s modernization. This is clearly reflected in the founder of the republican China, 
Sun Yat-sen’s Industrial Plan (1922).17 In Kirby’s view 
… the most ‘statist’ reading of Sun’s economic thought was the 
prevalent interpretation during the mainland period of the Nationalist 
rule, which stressed Sun’s commitment to the state-planned development 
of all basic heavy industries and infrastructure (ibid.: 1990: 125).  
The pursuit for a central government-planned industrialization began soon after the 
establishment of the Nanjing regime in 1927. Prior to the set-up of the NRC, various 
government ministries already began proposing different versions of national plans in 
line with Sun’s blueprint, such as the reconstruction ministry’s Ten-Year Plan in 1928, 
the industry ministry’s Ten-Year Plan in 1930, and Four-Year Plan in 1932, and the 
National Economic Council’s Three-Year Plan in 1931. It appears that to compete for 
limited resources, all these government ministries did was to make appealing plans—the 
more detailed and ambitious, the better. In fact, the rising national security concern 
encouraged ambitious plans for fast industrialization. Kirby (1990) noted that  
… planning agencies and personnel expanded significantly after the 
Manchurian Incident [1931, plotted by the Japanese], stressing the rapid 
growth of military-related state capitalism. … The greatest progress 
occurred under the National Resources Commission (NRC), the technical 
and managerial agency that came to dominate state industry (ibid.: 125). 
Nevertheless, Figure 2 does not convincingly show that the ambitious heavy 
industrialization plan that was implemented and managed under the NRC created a new 
path. Rather, the so-called nationalist ‘golden decade’ in China’s industrialization in 
1927–37 was a fairly smooth continuation of the earlier development that was rooted in 
the late Qing’s self-strengthening movement.18 In the light of the absolute size of the 
country, the heavy industry projects undertaken during that movement might be 
considered insignificant. But they were momentous if one takes the limited availability 
of national savings at that time into account. As argued by Page (2006: 90) ‘any 
constraint, be it a budget constraint, a spatial constraint, or a time constraint, imposes 
negative externalities [on other options] and … the exclusion of other options drives the 
path dependence’.  
Given a high resource constraint in the late Qing period, the industrial initiatives of the 
state inevitably created increasing returns to the selected industries while imposing costs 
upon other activities that could be more in line with China’s comparative advantage. In 
this situation, the government aiming at accelerated catch up was no longer a provider 
of public goods that was supposed to ensure that any external costs must be paid 
(through taxes). Instead, it reaped the benefits. Beneficial opportunities not only 
retained the resources already invested in the industries selected by the state, but also 
attracted even more physical and human capital investment to those industries. 
Consequently, supportive institutions grew, private businesses fought for government 
projects or procurements, and foreign investors pursued state preferential treatment or 
                                                 
17 The Industrial Plan was originally distributed in Chinese as Shiye Jihua, and later published in English 
as The International Development of China in 1922, and a new edition in 1953.  
18 My hypothesis here is preliminary and requires further explorations with empirical evidence.   13
joint ventures with the government. Frequent foreign invasions and internal threats 
pressured the government to expand its role and hence enhanced the process. All these 
helped sustain and strengthen the path rather than deviate or unlock from it. This path 
dependence view helps provide light on the state-engineering nature and the 
inefficiency problem of China’s subsequent industrialization in both the pre-1949 
nationalist regime and the post-1949 communist regime.  
5 Data  issues 
Data inadequacy has been a major obstacle to a proper assessment of China’s post-1949 
growth and productivity performance. Official output and employment data contain 
serious flaws (Maddison and Wu 2008; Wu and Yue 2010) and official estimates on 
capital stock are lacking (Wu 2008). Recently, I improved Maddison and Wu’s earlier 
estimates of real output (gross value added), reconstructed employment for three broad 
sectors, primary, secondary, and tertiary and estimated net capital stock for the Chinese 
economy as a whole. In the following paragraphs the shortcomings of previous datasets 
are discussed, and the generation of new estimates is explained.  
5.1 Employment 
The new employment data used in this study is the result of two major adjustments. The 
first was to fix a structural break in the official employment series that depicts a 
substantial jump of over 17 per cent or 94.2 million workers between 1989 and 1990. 
This jump created a subsequent huge discrepancy between total national employment 
and the sum of sectoral and industry level employment figures (Maddison and Wu 
2008). The second adjustment was to improve Maddison’s earlier estimates for 
employment of the so-called ‘non-material/non-market services’19 (Maddison 2007).  
My hypothesis for the 1990 structural break is that it was created by a gap or 
inconsistency between the census that captured the information sector’s activities and 
the regular statistical reporting system that only focused on the employment of the 
formal sector. If this is true, the gap should have appeared at the time when the planned 
employment system began to change. I investigated the earlier 1982 population census–
–the first most comprehensive population census in almost two decades––and compared 
this with later censuses and annual estimates. My discovery supported the hypothesis. It 
suggests that the break could have appeared in 1982 because the annual estimates did 
not take into account the employment emerging outside the labour planning and 
administration system as a result of policy change in the early 1970s that encouraged 
small, collective enterprises to employ surplus labour especially in rural areas. In the 
adjustment, I first made an interpolation between 1982 and 1990 using 1987 1 per cent 
population survey as the mid-point, thus the 1990 break was ‘moved’ to 1982. I then set 
                                                 
19 The term of ‘non-material services’ refers to service activities that are excluded from the ‘material 
product’ in the old Soviet-style national accounts or MPS (material product system). They include 
both market and non-market (governmental) services: banking, insurance, housing services, 
administration of real estate, social services, health, education, entertainment, personal services, R&D 
activities, the armed forces, police, government, and party organizations. They are now incorporated 
in the Chinese accounts, but the estimates are not shown explicitly. Official estimates show an 
estimate for the ‘tertiary’ sector as a whole, and a breakdown for two ‘material’ component sub-
sectors (transport-telecommunication and commerce).   14
1970 (unchanged) and 1982 as the starting and ending points to absorb the additional 
(outside-planning) employment using a ‘trend-deviation’ method. Finally, the additional 
numbers of employed in 1971–89, as a result of the exercise, were allocated into major 
sectors according to adjusted sectoral weights.20  
The second adjustment is based on newly gathered information on military services to 
make the inclusion of military personnel from 1949 to 1990 consistent over time and 
reflect annual changes.21 This has improved Maddison’s earlier work which simply 
added a fixed 3 million military personnel to each year’s ‘non-material service’ 
employment (Maddison 2007: 168). The results have a significant impact on the early 
1950s when the size of the military personnel was much larger than later. This provides 
a new employment base for improving Maddison’s earlier real output estimates for this 
sector (Maddison 2007).  
In addition to the two major adjustments, at the aggregate level of the economy, I made 
a further adjustment to the estimated workforce for ‘quality change’ using educational 
attainment as a proxy22. The quality adjusted estimates of labour input have been used 
in the growth accounting exercise presented below. 
5.2 Value  added 
The new estimates of China’s value added are the results of two major adjustments. The 
first was to improve Maddison’s value added estimates of ‘non-material services’ and 
the second was to improve my earlier value added estimates for industry.23 My work on 
the value added by ‘non-material services’ is also labour productivity-based, but it 
allows for annual labour productivity growth since the reform period rather than 
adopting Maddison’s ‘zero labour productivity growth’ hypothesis for the entire period. 
My closer examination has shown that there was indeed zero labour productivity growth 
in ‘non-material services’ from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, but the following 
growth was abnormally fast and looked implausible relative to other services in China 
(Maddison and Wu 2008) and compared with the experiences of other countries (van 
Ark 1996). My adjustment used my new employment estimates for ‘non-material 
                                                 
20 Since the additional labourers are least skilled and educated, they should be mainly engaged in labour-
intensive manufacturing and services. Thus, at the broad sectoral level, I allocated them into 
agriculture, industry, construction, and so-called material services according to their weights, 
excluding ‘non-material/non-market services’ (see the proceeding footnote). However, given the 
situation of underemployment in the farm sector, I downward adjusted the agricultural share by 40 
percent (Wu 2011).  
21 From 1990 onwards military personnel have been included in the official employment estimates (Wu 
2011). 
22 For the initial stock, I assume a level 500 million years of primary level-equivalent schooling, 
equivalent to about 15 years of education production after 1949. Following Maddison (1998), I derive 
primary school equivalent annual flows. However, similar to Wang and Yao (2001), I use the number 
of annual graduates rather than annual enrollment as in Barro and Lee (2001) and Maddison (1998) 
which depend on a strong assumption of the completion rate of each level of education (Wu 2011). 
23 For agriculture, I adopted and updated Maddison’s quantity output-based value added estimates as he 
showed that the official statistics were basically reliable (Maddison 1998). For construction and 
‘material services’ I simply accepted the official value added estimates because there is no useful 
information for any adjustment, the same treatment as that in Maddison and Wu (2008).   15
services’ with an assumption of zero labour productivity growth in 1952–77, 1 per cent 
annual growth in 1978–92 and 2 per cent annual growth afterwards. 
My latest work (Wu 2011) to improve China’s industrial value added is not a simple 
update of my earlier work that investigated the upward bias hypothesis24 for the official 
estimates (Wu 2002; Maddison and Wu 2008). It is still based on the physical output of 
commodities but instead of using single-benchmark weights and assuming a constant 
value added ratio, it incorporates multiple input-output table weights and time-variant 
value added ratios. A clear Gerschenkron effect is revealed in this new exercise that 
suggested the existence of substitution bias in my earlier estimates based on 1987 input-
output table weights—hence exaggerating the growth as explained by Gerschenkron 
(1951).25 This supported the shift from the single 1987 weights to multiple weights 
based on three Chinese full input-output tables for 1987, 1992, and 1997.26 Next, based 
on available Chinese input-output tables including full tables and reduced forms since 
1981 when the first MPS type input-output table was constructed and earlier work by 
Wu and Yue (2000), I can show that reform was accompanied by a declining value 
added ratio in industry from 38 per cent in 1978 to 23 per cent in 2007 (the most recent 
available input-output table) whereas the ratio stayed at 38–40 per cent in the pre-
reform period. This means that my earlier estimates based on a fixed (1987) value added 
ratio still exaggerated China’s real industrial growth.  
The results of the new exercise further confirmed my previous findings that the 
alternative estimates suggest a slower but more volatile growth rate of industrial value 
added than the official estimates. For the planning period 1953–78, the annual growth 
rate of the alternative estimates for the industrial sector is 9.54 per cent per year 
compared to 10.89 per cent of the official estimates, while for the reform period 1979–
2009, the corresponding figures are 7.48 and 10.87 per cent per year, respectively. For 
the whole period, the coefficient of variation of the annual growth rate is 1.72 for my 
estimates and only 1.18 for the official estimates. The new results look more plausible 
than my earlier work not only because they have highlighted the effects of policy shocks 
on China’s industrialization, but also because they have revealed an underlying path for 
the post-1949 period that can be well integrated with the pre-1949 path as shown in 
Figure 2.27 
                                                 
24 See Maddison (1998), Ren (1997), Woo (1998), Keidel (1992), Perkins (1988) and Rawski (2001, 
1993). The upward bias hypothesis states that official Chinese estimates systematically overestimate 
Chinese rates of economic growth. 
25 Since changes in prices are negatively correlated with changes in quantities of commodities (assuming 
that buyers are rational), a quantity index based on a later period would fall short of a quantity index 
based on an earlier period. In other words, the fixed-weight quantity index will overstate the growth 
rates after the benchmark year and understate the growth rates prior to the benchmark year. 
26 Input-output weight refers to input and output relationship or the ratio of GVA to gross value of 
output that can be derived from an input-output framework in national input-output tables. Multi 
input-output table weights as in the new exercise are better than single input-output table weights 
because they better capture structural changes over time.  
27 One of the main criticisms to my commodity-based output index is that it underestimated the effect of 
quality change, i.e. the quality change was miscounted as a price effect and hence removed (Holz 
2006a; Rawski 2008). To see if there was an obvious underestimation of the growth rate due to 
insufficient representation of quality change, I derived a gap series by subtracting my rates from the 
official rates and then estimated a trend to filter out the noises. If the critique were correct and the gap   16
5.3 Net  capital  stock 
Estimates of the net capital stock are required to examine China’s total factor 
productivity (TFP) performance. Compared with other studies, I used the National 
Bureau for Statistics (NBS) gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) rather than more 
problematic indicators such as total investment in fixed assets (TIFA) and newly 
increased fixed assets (NIFA) as the investment variable.28 I estimated a depreciation 
rate based on service life and declining balance measures at industry level rather than 
taking an arbitrary rate as in many existing studies, and constructed an alternative 
deflator rather than sticking to the official deflator for fixed assets investment.  
There are three major steps in my capital stock construction (Wu 2011). In the first step 
the GFCF series from the expenditure accounts is deflated by two alternative deflators, 
i.e. official implicit investment deflator derived from the expenditure accounts and my 
deflator based on producer prices for capital goods (machinery and building materials). 
In the second step the initial stock for 1952 K0 is estimated assuming that
) /( 0 0 T g I K + = δ , where I0 denotes the initial GFCF,  T g  stands for the annual average 
GDP growth rate of the selected period T (here set as 1952–55) and δ stands for a 
geometric depreciation rate.29 In the last step, the estimates of China’s net capital stock 
are obtained by applying the perpetual inventory method (PIM)  ) 1 ( 1 δ − + = − t t t K I K  to 
the above constructed variables.  
The results are approximately reconcilable with my estimates of industry level capital 
stock which are independent from the estimation for the aggregate economy (Wu 2008). 
As correctly put by Chow (2006), one of the important assessments of the estimated 
capital stock is the rate of return to capital implied by the capital stock. It follows that 
for 1954 Chow’s (1993) estimated capital stock implies a rate of return to capital of 
0.22, whereas Holz’s (2006b) work implies 0.993. Based on a market economy 
assumption for the Chinese economy in the early 1950s, Chow (2006) considers Holz’s 
result to be implausible. Although there are conceptual problems in Holz’s work (Wu 
                                                                                                                                             
indeed captured mainly the missing quality change, China’s industrial development seemed to have 
experienced a continuous quality improvement from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s but a significant 
quality deterioration since the industrial reform from the mid-1980s which did not look plausible at all 
(Wu 2011).  
28 There have been controversial views on which investment indicator should be used. Wang and 
Szirmai (2011) provide a good review of the literature on this topic. As explained in Wu (2008 and 
2011), while both TIFA and NIFA have coverage problem, TIFA contains serious double counting 
and it has been worsening since the property bubble in the mid-2000s that increased land transaction 
costs, and to some extent TIFA blurred the line between fixed capital formation and inventory (see 
Chow 1993). Frankly, many studies have misunderstood these concepts, especially Holz (2006b). 
Wang and Szirmai (2011) have made a good effort in adjusting NIFA and brought our attention to the 
concept of productive NIFA. However, due to long price distortions of residential housing, I opt for 
the indicator of GFCF.  
29 The assumed geometric decay function follows age-efficiency argument supported by empirical 
evidence (Hulten and Wykoff 1981), rather than hyperbolic function as used in Wang and Szirmai 
(2011). Choosing a more proper decay function for economic depreciation in the context of the 
Chinese economy is certainly an important issue that deserves further study. As for the value of δ, 
since it is found to be from 5.7 to 6.6 per cent over time in my work on industries (Wu 2008), 
alternative estimates are therefore made as 5, 6, and 7 per cent, as well as multiple rates assuming 
accelerated depreciation along with market-oriented reforms (Wu 2011).   17
2011), assuming that the economy in the early 1950s was a typical market one can also 
be questioned given our clear evidence that the state already owned and controlled the 
majority of the modern economy. Thus, an abnormally high rate of return to capital is 
quite reasonable though it may not be as high as what Holz’s results have implied. For a 
comparison, the rate implied by my estimated capital stock is 0.763 and by Wang and 
Szirmai’s work is 0.673, both lower than that of Holz but still much higher than that of 
Chow.30  
6  Growth, structural change, and productivity performance 
This section uses my newly constructed dataset (Wu 2011) to examine China’s post-
1949 industrialization in terms of growth, structural change, and productivity 
performance. The focus of the examination is the aggregate economy and its major 
sectors instead of the industrial sector alone in order to see the effect of the 
industrialization on other sectors.  
Path dependence is by no means efficient simply because it rules out alternatives and 
market-based competition, particularly if state is a main factor determining and 
sustaining the path. My working hypothesis is that if the state sector is generally less 
efficient than the private sector as both economic theory and empirical evidence have 
suggested and if China’s course of industrialization has indeed followed a path that has 
been developed and sustained by strong government interests, the Chinese economy 
would have been inherently inefficient.  
6.1  Division of the period covered 
Given the available data, the examination focuses on the period 1953–2009. The whole 
period is first divided into planning and reform periods, each further divided into several 
sub-periods to capture the effects of major policy regime shifts on the Chinese 
economy. More detailed events in each sub-period are given in the table in the 
Appendix.  
In the following analysis the planning period is divided into four sub-periods: the 
implementation of the Soviet-style central planning system through the first FYP in 
1953–57; the Maoist feverish GLF campaign and its disastrous aftermath in 1958–65, 
the defense industry-oriented ‘Great Third Front’ campaign together with the chaotic 
time of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–71, and the new policy efforts including the 
neo-GLF attempting to get the economy out of the shadow of the Cultural Revolution in 
1972–78.  
As for the reform period, it is also split into four sub-periods: the initial agricultural 
reform in 1979–84; a nationwide industrial reform through a dual-track price system in 
1985–91; the state sector reform following the adoption of ‘socialist market’ system in 
                                                 
30 All of these estimates conform to the ‘diminishing return to capital’ theorem, though their implied 
diminishing rates vary substantially. Using 1998 as an example, to follow Chow’s timeframe, the 
estimated rate of return to capital is ranged from 0.122 by Holz (2006b), 0.158 by Chow (1993), 0.162 
by Wu (2011) and 0.279 by Wang and Szirmai (2011). Compared to the corresponding rates in 1954, 
this suggests that the decline of the rate of return to capital between 1954 and 1998 is 2, 0.7, 3.5, and 
4.7 per cent, respectively.    18
1992–2001; China’s emergence as the ‘world factory’ following its WTO entry in 
2002–09. 
6.2 Growth  and  structural  change 
With this new dataset, let us first examine the growth performance at the sector level 
and hence structural changes of the Chinese economy against policy regime shifts as 
reported in Tables 1 and 2. The following observations are noteworthy. In terms of the 
real output growth, first, the period of GLF and its aftermath exhibited the slowest 
growth, while China’s post-WTO period showed the most rapid growth in the entire 
period in question.31 Under central planning, it is not surprising that the industrial sector 
(mining, manufacturing, and utilities) was the fastest growing sector, contributing 50 
per cent to the aggregate growth whereas only 4 per cent made by construction, 18 per 
cent by agriculture, and 28 per cent by services.32 In the reform period, services 
outpaced industry on average. As a result, the contribution of services to the aggregate 
growth rose to 41 per cent and the contribution of construction rose to 7 per cent, 
whereas the contribution by agriculture and industry declined to 15 and 37 per cent, 
respectively. Effects of policy and institutional changes are clearly evident especially 
with the high-growth performance of industry and construction in the first FYP period 
(1953–57), in the first phase of the ‘Third Front’ campaign (1966–70, Appendix) and in 
the period following China’s WTO entry, agriculture during the initial period of the 
agricultural reform (1979–84) and services in the early reform, as well as following the 
official adoption of the so-called ‘socialist market system’ (1993, Appendix). Besides, 
the substantial resource mobilization to support industrial development had strong 
negative impact on the growth of agriculture during the GLF period and on services 
during the ‘Third Front’ campaign.  
Second, changes of employment over the planning and reform periods also suggest 
strong policy and institutional effects. Industry and construction exhibited the most 
volatile employment growth among all sectors, though in general it was slower than its 
real output growth. Particularly, the post-GLF retrenchment resulted in a very slow 
growth in industrial employment and negative growth in construction employment 
during the period 1958–65, while the promotion for local and especially rural 
enterprises in 1972–78 resulted in the most rapid industrial employment growth that 
outpaced the industrial real output growth. During the planning period, agriculture and 
services maintained a somewhat ‘balanced growth’ between the real output and 
employment that to a large extent ‘reduced’ the pressures on job creation. However, in 
spite of the economy’s four decades of high-growth, China’s agriculture did not 
experience an absolute decline of employment until the 1990s. As shown in Table 1, the 
post-WTO period was accompanied by the fastest decline of agricultural employment of 
2.3 per cent a year thanks to the WTO-induced new round of industrial expansion that 
enhanced China’s export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing. 
                                                 
31 Of course, the fastest and largest ever money injection in 2009 to fight the global financial crisis 
helped sustain this period’s strong growth. However, even if the two crisis-hit years of 2008–09 are 
removed, China’s post-WTO period still exhibited the fastest growth in history. 
32 Sectoral contribution to aggregate growth rate is derived based on the growth rates in Table 1 and 
GVA weights (at 1990 prices) in Table 2. There are small discrepancies between the aggregate growth 
rate and the sum of the weighted sectoral growth rates due to the underlying index number problems.   19
Third, as Table 2 shows, different growth performances across sectors also resulted in 
structural changes in output and employment. The share of the industrial sector in the 
real output increased over the 1950s–60s, remained almost unchanged over the 1970s–
1990s, and then rose rather substantially following China’s WTO entry. It should be 
noted that the change of the real output structure in agriculture and services in the 1960s 
reversed: the share of agriculture increased rather than continued to decline, and the 
share of services declined rather than continued to rise. In fact, for services this decline 
continued in the last planning period 1972–78.  
In terms of employment structure, the regress was even more evident. In 1966–71, both 
industry and services moved back almost to their initial employment shares in the 
1950s. In the same period, the significant decline of industry’s share in employment 
along with the rise of its share in the real output reflected misallocation of labour. 
During the reform period, deregulation in the labour market and the growth of labour-
intensive industries and services started and sustained China’s most significant 
transformation of labour in history from agriculture to industry, construction and 
services. From the early 1980s to the end of 2000s, the share of agriculture in 
employment declined from 65 to 45 per cent whereas the share of services in 
employment rose from 14 to 31 per cent. Yet, as of the most recent period China still 
used 45 per cent of its workforce in agriculture to produce 16 per cent of GDP, which 
suggested that the industrialization had not brought about an efficient allocation of 
labour resources.  
6.3 Productivity  performance   
We now examine China’s industrialization from a productivity perspective. Table 3 
presents a decomposition of annual change of the aggregate labour productivity into the 
contribution of sectoral labour productivity change and the effect of resource 
reallocation across sectors in terms of percentage point. The latter measures the 
contribution of resources that have moved from sectors with lower labour productivity 
to sectors with higher labour productivity.33  
For the aggregate economy, labour productivity growth in the reform period was on 
average more than double that of the planning period (5.3 versus 2.3 per cent per 
annum). Before the reform, 35 per cent of labour productivity growth was attributable to 
industry, 5 per cent due to construction and 60 per cent due to the reallocation effect, 
leaving agriculture and services making no contribution at all. A closer examination of 
the sub-periods of the planning period in Table 3 shows that the first FYP period 
appeared much healthier than other periods with the highest labour productivity growth 
(4.5 per cent) and a positive reallocation effect (1 percentage point or ppt). In 1958–65, 
however, a significant labour productivity decline in agriculture (-0.7 ppts) and almost 
nil gain in the allocation effect offset about 40 per cent of labour productivity gain in 
other sectors. Inefficiency was also evident in the period of 1972–78 during which more 
                                                 
33 To measure the reallocation effect, sectoral labour productivity needs to be weighted by nominal 
output (GVA). Therefore, the sum of so-weighted sectoral labour productivity is not equal to the 
aggregate labour productivity measured in real terms. That is, the growth rate of total labour 
productivity in Table 3 is not simply a result of subtracting the growth rate of total employment from 
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than 50 per cent of the gain from resource reallocation (3.7 ppts) was offset by the drop 
in labour productivity in industry (-2.1 ppts).  
Table 3 also shows that the growth of labour productivity during the reform period was 
5.3 per cent per year, of which 2 ppts were attributable to industry, 0.2 ppts to 
construction, 1 ppt to agriculture and services, respectively, and 1.2 ppts to the 
reallocation effect. The fastest labour productivity growth during the reform era was 
observed in 2002–09 as 8.7 per cent per year following China’s WTO entry, of which 
3.5 ppts were attributable to industry, 0.6 ppts to construction, 0.8 ppts to agriculture, 
1.8 ppts to services, and 2 ppts to the reallocation effect. The reform of 1979–84 
brought about perhaps the most rapid labour productivity growth in agriculture in 
China’s post-1949 history. In this period, aggregate labour productivity grew by 3.6 per 
cent per year of which 40 per cent (1.6 ppts) came from agriculture. Since the 1990s, 
services have enjoyed a high labour productivity growth thanks to the government’s 
promotion for the so-called ‘socialist market economy’ and more rapid industrialization 
and urbanization, especially after China’s WTO entry. During the periods 1992–2001 
and 2002–09 total labour productivity grew by 6 and 8.7 per cent per annum, 
respectively, of which over 20 per cent came from services. 
Labour productivity is only a partial measure of productivity because it incorporates the 
effect of changing capital-labour ratios. Besides, labour productivity that is measured by 
numbers employed also improperly assumes that the human capital embodied in the 
workforce is constant. Obviously, efficiency will deteriorate if an increase in physical 
or/and human capital does not bring about the same increase in the real output. A full 
picture of the Chinese economy’s efficiency and productivity performance is depicted in 
Table 4 including the contribution of measured inputs, i.e. employment, physical and 
human capital, and TFP for each period. The results are also depicted in Figure 3 for an 
intuitive examination. The TFP is estimated by using time-variant factor income shares 
based on available Chinese input-output tables since 1987 and estimates for the period 
prior to 1987 (Wu 2011). 
The estimated TFP performance does not suggest that there has been a stable 
improvement of efficiency or a sustained productivity growth for the entire period. The 
central planning period saw a TFP decline by 1.2 per cent per year while the reform 
period exhibited a TFP growth by merely 0.3 per cent per year. It also appears that the 
investment in physical capital was the primary driving force of the Chinese economy in 
all periods contributing about 83 per cent of the annual growth in the planning period 
and 86 per cent in the reform period.  
Comparing the TFP performance over different periods, one may be convinced that 
policy and institutional shocks are the best candidates to explain the changes of China’s 
TFP growth. Interestingly, two significant positive TFP gains are somewhat ‘related’ to 
the central planning system: one with China’s shift to central planning in 1953–57 and 
the other with China’s departure from the central planning system in 1979–84. 
However, I would argue that the most significant TFP gain in 1953–57 was mainly 
attributed to the better use of the idle production capacity (in terms of both physical and 
human capital) caused by wars and instabilities due to the 1949 revolution rather than 
the implementation of the first FYP. Besides, positive incentives because of the arrival 
of the long-awaited peace also might contribute the TFP growth. On the other hand, the 
TFP gain in 1979–84 was mainly caused by the de facto privatization in agriculture   21
which improved farmers’ incentives, as well as initial reform measures in the rest of the 
economy. This was, not surprisingly, only a one-off gain. 
All major political and ideological campaigns in the pre-reform era, whether or not 
aiming at economic growth, resulted in severe negative TFP growth. The period 1972–
78 experienced the most rapid growth in investment and employment under central 
planning, but it was extremely inefficient because of wasteful investment together with 
long deteriorating incentive problems. During this period nearly 40 per cent of the 
growth vanished because of inefficient use of inputs (estimated based on Table 4). 
On the other hand, perhaps contrary to what many believed, the reform measures 
between the mid-1980s and the beginning of the 2000s were not TFP growth-
promoting. The industrial reform that began in 1985 brought about a shock reflected by 
a negative TFP growth in 1985–91. In the following period 1992–2001, the period of 
the fastest ever growth in physical investment resulted in the most rapid economic 
growth since 1949. The efficiency of the economy in this period slightly improved but 
TFP growth still remained negative.  
China’s WTO entry at the end of 2001 resulted in significant positive TFP growth, 
though not as high as those estimates using unadjusted official data in other studies (Wu 
2011). However, this may not simply suggest that China benefited from its comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing through a substantially enlarged external 
market. In fact following the WTO entry, China found itself in a favourable position 
given that the investment in the 1990s had built up a huge production capacity, of which 
a large part was under-utilized, evidenced by China’s long deflation from 1996 to 2002 
in which producer prices declined by 1.3 per cent per year (NBS 2010).34  
To show a cumulated productivity effect on the Chinese economy as well as its long-run 
trend, I construct a TFP index and present it in Figure 4. The index is based on 1978 to 
highlight the impact of the reform. A closer examination of China’s TFP locus reveals 
more details. It shows that compared with the 1978 level China’s initial level of TFP 
was 50 per cent higher. This simply means that the planning period suffered from a 
general and sustained productivity deterioration. The GLF caused a huge damage to 
productivity and the economy has not yet emerged from the shadow of this event. The 
policy retreat in 1963–65 only resulted in a short-term turnaround in productivity 
performance. It then entered another long decline during most of the 1970s until the 
agricultural reform in 1979. The initial reform was TFP promoting. However, the 
industrial reform with the dual-track price system of 1985 was accompanied by a 
significant decline in TFP. Deng’s push for bolder reform in 1992 produced a short spell 
of positive TFP growth in 1992–95, China entered the longest TFP decline in the reform 
period in 1995–2001 that was ended by its WTO entry. The post-WTO TFP growth was 
halted again by the global economic crisis in 2008.  
The trend line (estimated by a polynomial function) in Figure 4 helps ‘filter out’ most 
short-term fluctuations and noises—hence the effect of changes in capacity utilization 
can be more or less ‘observed’. The figure thus depicts China’s productivity growth 
over the long-term, reflecting the country’s inefficient path of industrialization under the 
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communist government. This productivity trend shows that although the reforms since 
1978 reversed a long period of productivity deterioration that began by the end of the 
1950s, it will still take a long time before the country can make up for its productivity 
losses due to past policy mistakes and institutional shocks.  
7 Concluding  remarks 
In this paper I started out by exploring the role of the government in China’s 
industrialization by comparing China and India in their post-Second World War growth 
paths. Following the path dependence theory, I then took an even longer historical 
perspective to show that China’s industrialization was initiated and engineered by the 
state from the very beginning. It was motivated by the pressing needs to secure the 
regime’s position and to enhance national security in the period from the 1860s to the 
1890s. I also showed how industrialization was subsequently sustained by the 
nationalist government in even more ambitious heavy industry-oriented plans from the 
mid-1920s to mid-1930s, and how it was further enhanced during the wartime 
motivated by mounting national defence needs. My empirical evidence shows that 
China’s post-1949 state-led industrialization, strongly motivated by the urge to achieve 
a fast catch-up with the West, has closely followed an underlying path that began at 
least in the beginning of the twentieth century. Opposed to conventional wisdom, 
neither the new communist regime in 1949 nor the reform in 1978 created a new path 
for China.  
I have argued that if the state sector is generally less efficient than the private sector or 
if government intervention tends to distort the incentives of economic agents hence 
reducing efficiency as both economic theory and empirical evidence have suggested, 
and if China’s course of industrialization has indeed followed a path that has been 
developed and sustained by strong government interests, the Chinese economy would 
have been inherently inefficient. My hypothesis is well supported by an analysis of 
China’s post-1949 productivity growth using a newly constructed dataset for the total 
economy with a breakdown of major sectors. The findings show that there has been 
almost no steady and continuous productivity growth or efficiency improvement since 
1949. Reform efforts through policy and institutional instruments to improve efficiency 
have been virtually ineffective after some initial gains. 
The key factor behind such an inefficient path is not the inefficient use of resources that 
have sustained and developed the path, but lies in the interest groups nurtured by the 
state-led industrialization that have influenced the allocation of resources. These interest 
groups in many cases are deeply rooted in the communist party and the government 
bureaucracy. They will fight to defend their interests if any reform is seen as a potential 
threat to them. Although deteriorating inefficiency from time to time forced the 
government to retreat from comprehensive and rigid planning controls and eventually 
forced it to adopt market-oriented reforms by the end of the 1970s, the state interests in 
the economy and their influences have never been weakened. For the government, 
reform is in essence only a means not a goal. The reforms search for a better way to 
speed up income growth albeit at the expense of high inequality. This explains the 
growth of tax revenue and national savings for the development of industries selected 
by the state, so that they can continuously enjoy cheap credit, easy access to scarce 
resources, and protected markets.    23
As a result, the market-oriented reforms that have allowed the private sector and foreign 
enterprises to play a role and opening up for international competition are still subject to 
state interests and government interventions and they are highly growth-motivated 
without any efficiency concerns. Indeed, Wu and Shea (2008) show that it is the 
government factor rather than the development of market institutions that has played a 
key role in driving China’s growth while maintaining stability in the reform era. Their 
findings have answered the great ‘China puzzle’ of high-growth and low volatility in the 
absence of healthy market institutions. Inefficiency problems become worse when 
growth is increasingly driven by competition between local governments following 
fiscal decentralization. While some Chinese economists have highly praised the role of 
such inter-governmental competition in promoting fast growth (Zhang and Zhou 2008), 
they have virtually ignored that when pursuing high growth—government bureaucracies 
do not act to maximize profits or minimize costs.  
China’s WTO entry appears to be the best chance for China to break the long inefficient 
path through institution-building and efficiency improvement via more international 
competition. However, I have become convinced that it is too naïve to believe this. The 
main obstacle is still the interests of the party and the government. As Wu and Shea put 
it (2008) 
…the collapse of the communist governments in the Eastern Bloc had 
further convinced the Chinese communists that the legitimacy of their 
regime would only be secured by maintaining social stability and 
delivering economic growth. Ironically, this endeavor to safeguard its 
legitimacy has compromised the government’s commitment to the 
market-oriented reform and created strong incentives for the government 
to engage in or interfere with business decisions, especially regarding 
financial resource allocation, even if it requires the sacrifice of market 
efficiency and institution building. From government officials’ 
perspective, direct intervention in business decisions could help protect 
their vested interests…, while building up strong institutions would 
certainly do the opposite (ibid.: 126). 
WTO accession may act as a counterforce to the ideological and political constraints. It 
will encourage the government to strengthen the financial institutions in order to 
facilitate a smooth integration with the global economy. However, uncertainty about the 
consequences of further opening up to global competition due to ideological and 
political constraints increased the government’s preoccupation with growth and 
stability, which watered down the efficiency improvement effects of WTO entry.  
China’s post-WTO emergence as the world’s manufacturing power house is not an 
archetypal market fairytale but a story of how the government has successfully 
manipulated various policy instruments to make the market serve its best interests. To a 
growth-motivated local government inefficiency is an unobservable, external cost 
(negative externality) born by other localities, by the general public or by future 
generations. To attract investment, no matter whether foreign or domestic, land costs 
can be lowered or waived, environmental charges can be bypassed or postponed thus 
raising national health costs, low wage rates can be maintained for a long period, and 
water and energy can be subsidized. In doing so, these governments are actually 
rewarding current growth while incurring costs for the future. This is, however, not the 
end of the story. The unpaid or underpaid costs will artificially raise profits and then   24
encourage overinvestment and overproduction. Consequently, it will intensify 
competition that in turn calls for further government support. When this goes on, both 
Chinese producers, who produce consumer goods for exporting, and foreign consumers 
in high-income countries are ‘subsidized’ by the Chinese government. In my view, such 
a dual-subsidization is to some extent responsible for the existing global imbalances.  
The ‘success’ of the Chinese model cannot be easily replicated under any type of true 
democracy. Breaking away from this inefficient path requires a genuine political reform 
in China––an important stage that China cannot bypass prior to achieving modernity. In 
such a process the state has to substantially withdraw from business and to become the 
real public goods provider. It should promote and help build up market institutions, 
remove barriers to factor mobility, and ensure all external costs of production to be paid 
or externalities to be internalized.    25
Appendix 
China’s major economic and political events in 1953-2009 
 
Period Economic  planning and policy Political and institutional event
Planning:   
1953–57  The 1st FYP; Soviet financial loans 
and technical assistance; Soviet-
type central planning 
Socialist transformation in 
industry, handicrafts, and services 
(1953–56); collectivization in 
agriculture (1955–56); the ‘Anti-
Rightists’ movement (1957) 
1958–65  The GLF (1958-59); the 2nd FYP 
(1958–63); the Great Famine 
(1960–62); the first decentralization 
(1958); the post-GLF retrenchment 
(1960–62); recentralization (1961–
65) 
Communization in agriculture 
(1958-59); ‘anti-Rightist Wing’ 
within the Communist Part of 
China (CPC) (1959); Sino-Soviet 
breakup (1960); policy retreat 
(1960–65) 
1966–71  The 3rd FYP (1966–70), i.e. the 
first five years of the ‘Great Third 
Front’ construction (1966–75); the 
second decentralization (1970)  
The chaotic period of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-68); Mao’s 
triumph over the ‘capitalist 
roaders’ (1969) 
1972–78  The 4th and 5th FYPs (1971–75; 
1976–80); promotion for local and 
rural enterprises; the neo-GLF 
campaign (1976–78) 
Sino-US rapprochement (1972); 
Mao’s death (1976); the fall of the 
Gang of Four (Madam Mao’s elite 
group) (1976) 
Reform    
1979–84  Agricultural reform; abolishment of 
the ‘Great Third Front’ construction; 
fiscal decentralization; special 
Economic Zones (1980); 
experimental industrial reform; the 
6th FYP (1981–85) 
The beginning of Deng’s era (at 
the end of 1978); rehabilitation of 
the ‘Rightists’ (1979); 
decollectivization in rural China 
(1982–83) 
1985–91  Nationwide industrial reform (1985); 
dual-track price reform; trade and 
foreign exchange regime reform; 
the 7th FYP (1986–90); legal 
developments for foreign direct 
investment (1986–88) 
Crackdown of the Tiananmen 
Movement (1989); CPC’s debate 
of the nature of the reform 
(socialism or capitalism?) (1990-
91) 
1992–2001 Deepening  state-owned  enterprises 
(SOE) reform; de facto privatization 
of small SOEs (1997); the longest 
deflation since the reform (1997–
2002); the 8th and 9th FYPs (1991–
95; 1996–2000)   
Deng’s push for bolder reform and 
opening up (1992); CPC’s 
adoption of Deng’s ‘Socialist 
Market Economy’ (1993) 
2002–09  China’s WTO entry (at the end of 
2001); Strategic adjustment and 
advancement of the state sector; 
abolition of agricultural tax (2006); 
the 10th and 11th FYPs (2001–05; 
2006–10) 
CPC’s adoption of Jiang’s more 
capitalist philosophy (‘three 
represents’) (2002); Hu’s new 
ideological promotion for a 
‘harmonious society’ (2005); 
Adoption of the controversial 
PRC’s first Property Law (2007) 
Sources: Based on information and materials in Wang (2010). 
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Table 6.1: Growth of output and employment by major sector, 1953-2009 
(Per cent per annum) 
 
Growth value added  
(at 1990 Prices)   
Employment 
 
  Total A  I  C  S   Total A  I  C  S 
P l a n n i n g :         
1953-
1957  5.6 3.7  16.0  17.2 3.7 2.5 1.6 4.1 25.5 2.9 
1958-
1965 3.5  0.6  7.2  2.3 5.2 2.4 2.5 3.0 -6.8  3.4 
1966-
1971  4.8 3.1  10.3 8.4 1.9 3.7 3.3 9.6 4.7 2.4 
1972-
1978 4.4  2.2  6.9  3.6 4.0 3.1 1.2 12.0 4.0  5.8 
1953-
1978  4.4 2.2  9.5 7.0 3.8 2.9 2.2 7.2 5.0 3.7 
Reform:        
1979-
1984  7.4 7.1  5.4 9.7 9.7 3.4 2.1 4.6 9.3 7.1 
1985-
1991  4.7 3.5  4.8 8.6 5.2 2.5 1.6 2.2 7.7 4.8 
1992-
2001  7.0 3.8  6.6 9.6 8.9 1.1 -0.7 0.4 5.2 5.0 
2002-
2009  9.2 4.3  12.4  12.4 7.7 0.9 -2.3 4.0 2.0 3.3 
1979-
2009  7.1 4.5  7.5  10.1 7.9 1.8 0.0 2.5 5.7 4.9 
Notes: A: Agriculture, I: Mining, manufacturing and utilities, C: Construction, S: Services. 
Source: Based on estimates in Wu (2011), updated using China Statistical Yearbook 
2010 (NBS 2010), with adjustments. 
   
 
Table 6.2: Structural changes of output and employment, 1953-2009 
(Total = 100) 
  GVA (at 1990 prices)    Employment 
  A I C  S    A I C  S 
Planning:     
1953-1957 51.2  14.0 2.2 32.6 81.0 6.2 2.5 10.3 
1958-1965 36.3  21.2 2.5 40.0    72.9  9.0 4.2 13.9 
1966-1971 39.0  25.8 2.5 32.6    79.9  7.1 2.0 11.0 
1972-1978 33.9  34.1 2.9 29.1    74.0 12.8 2.0 11.3 
1953-1978 39.1  24.4 2.6 33.9    76.4  9.0 2.8 11.8 
Reform:      
1979-1984 29.5  35.5 3.1 31.9 64.9 18.3 2.4 14.4 
1985-1991 27.1  33.6 4.1 35.2    59.9 17.6 4.3 18.2 
1992-2001 22.4  33.4 5.3 39.0    52.7 17.2 5.6 24.6 
2002-2009 15.6  39.5 6.0 39.0    44.7 18.0 6.2 31.1 
1979-2009 23.1  35.4 4.8 36.7    54.6 17.7 4.8 22.9 
Notes and source: See Table 1.   
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Table 6.3: Sectoral contribution to labor productivity growth and reallocation effect, 
1952-2009 





Sectoral contribution and reallocation effect 
(percentage point) 
A I C  S  Reallocation 
Planning:         
1953-1957 4.5 0.9  2.6  -0.3  0.2  1.0 
1958-1965 1.8 -0.7  1.4  0.4  0.5  0.2 
1966-1971 1.6 -0.1  0.2  0.1  -0.1  1.5 
1972-1978 1.5 0.3 -2.1 0.0 -0.4 3.7 
1953-1978 2.3 0.0  0.8  0.1  0.0  1.4 
Reform:           
1979-1984 3.6 1.6  0.3  0.0  0.6  1.1 
1985-1991 2.2 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 
1992-2001 6.0 0.8 2.5 0.3 1.4 1.0 
2002-2009 8.7 0.8 3.5 0.6 1.8 2.0 
1979-2009 5.3 1.0  2.0  0.2  1.0  1.2 
Notes: The sectoral contribution and reallocation effect estimates are calculated using 
the formula:  t i t i t i t i i t i i t i i t i t i t R y L L y y ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + Δ = Δ − Δ + Δ = Δ , , , , , , , ln ) ln ln ( ln ln ω ω ω , where y and 
L stand for  labor productivity and employment, respectively, whose annual growth rate 
is defined as log difference,  t i, ω  stands for sectoral output weight in nominal terms with 
a bar denoting an average of two adjacent periods, and R stands for the reallocation 
effect across sectors.  
Source: See Table 1. 
   
 
Table 6.4: Sources of growth of the Chinese economy, 1953-2009 












Planning:        
1953-1957 5.6  0.7 0.4 3.6 0.9 
1958-1965 3.5  0.6 0.7 3.7  -1.6 
1966-1971 4.8  0.9 1.0 3.6 -0.7 
1972-1978 4.4  0.7 1.4 4.8 -2.6 
1953-1978 4.4  0.7 0.9 3.9  -1.2 
Reform:        
1979-1984 7.4  0.8 0.4 4.6 1.7 
1985-1991 4.7  0.6 0.1 4.9  -0.9 
1992-2001 7.0  0.3 0.4 7.0  -0.7 
2002-2009 9.2  0.2 0.4 7.1 1.5 
1979-2009 7.1  0.4 0.3 6.1 0.3 
Notes: The estimates are obtained by the standard growth accounting approach 
using input-output table factor income weights as explained in text. The 
underlying neo-classic framework imposes strong institutional and behavioural 
assumptions (such as free mobility of factors and profit maximization of firms) 
which may not be appropriate to an economy like China. However, to compare 
with many existing studies these assumptions are accepted in this study. Since 
the Chinese economy may not be operating on the production possibility frontier, 
TFP growth may capture both technological progress and efficiency 
improvement. 
Source: See Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Chinese and Indian per capita GDP level and growth trends, 1950–2010 
(In 2010 PPP dollar and logarithmic scale) 
 
Notes: The TCB-TED measure of per capita GDP is in 2010 EKS PPP dollars. The pre-2003 
TCB series for China is largely based on Maddison and Wu (2008) which used the Geary-
Khamis PPP approach. The values for 2010 are preliminary. The trends are obtained by 
regression approach. 
Source: Wu (2011), Maddison and Wu (2008), and TCB (2011). 
 
Figure 2: China’s century-long industrial development 
(Real industrial output, 1984 = 100) 
 
Notes:    The original data are two separate series covering 1912–1948 and 1949–2008, 
respectively. The data series for 1912–1948 is constructed using commodity-based estimates of 
industrial net value added (NVA) by Chang. The data series for 1949–2008 is also based on 
commodities but conforming to the SNA concept of gross value added (GVA). The two data 
series are linked assuming that the change of capital consumption was similar to the change of 
NVA. The trend is estimated by an exponential function. 
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Figure 3: Sources of growth of the Chinese economy 
(Per cent per annum; period average) 
 
Notes and source: See Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Total factor productivity index of the Chinese economy 
(1978=100) 
 
Notes and source: See Table 4. 
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